Information Sharing In Disaster Response: Towards An International Standard

Wired.com mentioned our efforts in a recent article that quoted USSOUTHCOM: "they are poised to integrate some crowdsourcing to see what the situation is on the ground with respect to medical information. Eventually, that kind of tool could be used for biosurveillance –- monitoring and mapping the outbreak of infectious diseases."

The 2010 Haiti disaster response effort was my first time interacting with a US federal agency in such an open framework as that offered by APAN.  I was introduced via our participation in Crisis Mappers and collaborative discussions with InSTEDD and Ushahidi.  Although I appreciate USSOUTCOM's desire to remain conservative in their assessment of APAN's utility, from the perspective of operational biosurveillance it is frankly a breath of fresh air.

Two key observations that are relevant to the Wired article (and why it is so important to recognize Crisis Mappers community and APAN as setting the new world standard in crisis communications):

1. The bigger the organization, as embodied by funding lines, personnel, and complexity of task it has claimed, the less likely it is able to participate effectively in near-real time operational biosurveillance communications.  This is especially true when considering the ultimate objective of issuing warnings.
2. As the emergency response community has always emphasized, the need to understand which individuals are gatekeepers versus bridges is critical. 

Currently the best and most timely information we receive from Haiti is from individuals, the majority of whom work in smaller, more agile organizations.  We avoid gatekeepers.  One multi-billion dollar US NGO flatly declined to participate in information sharing, claiming "we already know there are outbreaks in Haiti".  Technically speaking, at the time of the comment there were no outbreaks reported in Haiti, just sporadic, expected reporting of baseline disease.  This particular NGO has a history of little to no cooperation with other NGOs, a common problem in the NGO world.  But this is not to pick on a particular organization or community of organizations- this is a human problem related to trust and other factors that dictate whether one individual(s) will chose to share information with another.

The challenge of managing crisis information flows was highlighted brilliantly by Uriel Rosenthal, Paul 't Hart, and Michael T. Charles (1989): 

• In crisis situations, formal rules and procedures give way to informal processes and improvisations.  Necessity is the mother of invention.  Under the pressure of the circumstances, official authorities may be overruled by situational leaders.  Formal authority loses out to legitimate power.  For making critical decisions, official qualifications and jurisdictions happen to be less important that the capacity for a resolute and rapid response to the crisis.  This is precisely what Crisis Mappers and APAN represent, as well as the entire warning process of the 2009 pandemic H1N1 influenza from our perspective.

• Public agencies can be viewed as information processing systems... They tend to be disposed to consume information that is easy to categorize, leaning towards so-called programmed decisions.  Here I would propose "public agencies" in this era includes both governmental and non-profit organizations

• Crisis information does not fit in with this pattern.  Crisis information is threatening, it is frightening, it is unfamiliar, it is new, it is surprising and it has 'never been heard before'.  Crisis information is unprecedented, and it is critical, yet ambiguous.  It may come in massive quantities, yet 'just that damned thing we must know, we do not' (at other stages during the same crisis, lack of new data, subsequent rumor circuits and other forms of non-information may produce another and often unthought of challenge to decision makers).  It cannot be categorized in usual ways.  Nonetheless, crises demand rapid information processing, but also very careful information processing.  Under these circumstances the usual patterns of organizational and interorganizational communication do not suffice.
  

• In crisis situations there is a considerable increase in the volume and speed of upward and downward communications... High level officials directly communicate with low-ranking bureaucrats.  Key decision makers run the risk of being overwhelmed by an overload of information from sources of which they are unfamiliar.  

• In crisis situations, on the other hand, decision makers tend to give priority to the source of information instead of its content.  They are inclined to rely on trusted, and liked sources.  In conflict crises they may become completely consumed in closed communication circuits made up solely of allies, adherents, and friends.  This point is dead-on.

• Paradoxically enough, potentially rewarding channels of communication are often closed off by strategies or tactics that are destined to isolate the opponents.  In such cases it may become impossible to acquire accurate information about the most crucial aspects of the crisis.

With the tremendous variety of international assistance being provided by so many different professional disciplines, organization types, and governments, action certainly speaks loud in terms of coming together to help others.  But the issue of open information sharing is such an important one, and one we must continue to push on.  The unfortunate fact remains there are several major organizations responding in Haiti now, flush with funding, who are not participating in situational awareness.

Participation in situational awareness is absolutely essential for the following reasons:

• rapid identification of events that may result in additional loss of life or further disruption in the response theater
• rapid identification of victims' needs not otherwise identified 
• improved response logistics, efficiency, and cost

I would propose it be considered a mandatory international standard for any responding organization or individual to share situational awareness if they intend to participate in a disaster response theater.  Donors and taxpayers should insist on this standard as well. 

References:

Rosenthal U, 't Hart P, Charles MT.  The World of Crises and Crisis Management.  In: Rosenthal U, 't Hart P, Charles MT, eds Coping With Crises: The Management of Disasters, Riots and Terrorism.  Springfield: Charles C. Thomas; 1989:3-33.